Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 5 | Issue 2

Fall 2010

Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty
Marc D. Stern

Recommended Citation
Marc D. Stern, Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 307 (2010).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol5/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Article 5

Copyright 2010 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 5 (Fall 2010)

Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty
Marc D. Stern*
¶1

In other forums, I have taken the position that the state should recognize same-sex
marriage even as it protects religious liberty.1 I have also, by signing a letter drafted by
Professors Robin Wilson, Thomas Berg, and others,2 indicated my support for generous
protection of the religious liberty of those who oppose same-sex marriage. In this letter,
we proposed that recognition of religious liberty be a part of same-sex marriage
legislation pending in several states. This was a joint proposal, and, as is the nature of
such things, it was difficult to reach complete agreement on every detail. The point was
to establish a broad draft statute addressing the conflict that has arisen between the right
to same-sex marriage and the right to religious freedom, and to provide a template for
legislation that can adequately deal with the issue. Our suggestion for a statute applying
to all marriages, but in practical terms relevant only to same-sex marriages, ran:
No individual, no religious or denominational organization, and no
charitable or educational organization which is operated, supervised, or
controlled by or connected with a religious organization, shall be liable,
penalized, or denied benefits under the laws of this state or any
subdivision of this state, including but not limited to laws regarding
employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, licensing,
government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status, for refusing to
provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or
privileges related to the solemnization of any marriage, for refusing to
solemnize any marriage, or for refusing to treat as valid any marriage, if
such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such
individuals or organizations to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs,
provided that
(a) a refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges related to the solemnization of any marriage shall not
be protected under this section where (i) a party to the marriage is unable
to obtain any similar services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges elsewhere, and (ii) such inability to obtain similar
*
Marc D. Stern is acting Co-Executive Director and General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress
and Director of its Commission on Law, Social Justice, and Intergroup Relations. The views expressed
here are his own.
1
Marc D. Stern, Op-ed, Will Gay Rights Trample Religious Freedom?, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/17/opinion/oe-stern17; Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law,
University of St. Thomas School of Law, et al., to John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire (May 1, 2009),
available at http://www.mirror-of-justice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-gov.-lynch-re-h.b.-436-1.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, et al.,
to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine (Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-100509.pdf.
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services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges
elsewhere constitutes a substantial hardship; and
(b) no government employee may refuse to assist in the solemnization of
any marriage under this section if another government employee is not
available and willing to do so.
¶2

¶3

¶4

Some of the proposed statute’s provisions are easily defended, such as exempting
religious agencies from the requirement to recognize same-sex marriage. At the same
time, the provision prohibiting the denial of government funding to institutions that do
not recognize same-sex marriage can be questioned, or the provision allowing an
exemption to corporations can be limited to apply only to small, closely held corporations
without serious harm to religious liberty.
The proposal is ambiguous on some points. For instance, are individuals who do
business in corporate form protected (and, if so, what size corporations would be
protected)? Or, do only those acting in an individual capacity fall within the statute?
While beyond the scope of this Article, this and other issues deserve to be discussed in
detail and may plausibly and reasonably be debated.
In this Article, I will attempt to put the arguments in a larger framework. First I
will introduce the topic by providing the background of the debate, including the basis for
religious liberty protection and the practical importance of enshrining such protection in
any same-sex marriage legislation. Then, I will demonstrate that the ability to claim
religious protection depends largely upon whether the issue of same-sex marriage is
framed as one of equality or personal liberty. Next, I will explore the argument proposed
by some for the privatization of religion—that religion has no place in the public sphere.
Finally, I will briefly discuss the argument for moral autonomy.
I. INTRODUCTION

¶5

¶6

While the details of any such statute invite debate, the general principle of the
proposed statute above—that religious accommodation is necessary—should not be
debatable. Recognition of same-sex marriage, whatever technical form legal arguments
made on its behalf take, exemplifies a “live and let live” policy. That same policy should
apply equally to religious believers who oppose same-sex marriage—they should not be
required to act directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that appear
to confer their personal blessing on such marriages. While such exemptions are
necessary, there are probably far fewer people around who would invoke such
exemptions than is generally thought. And, given the poll data,3 there will be even fewer
as older people move off the commercial scene.
That recognizing same-sex marriage will, for the while, put many people with
“traditional” religious beliefs4 in a vise between their religious commitments and the law
3

See, e.g., Press Release, Quinnipiac University, Same Sex Marriage Loses Support in New Jersey,
Quinnipiac University Poll Finds (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=1400;
Support for Same-Sex Marriage By Age & State, http://contexts.org/socimages/2009/11/05/support-forsame-sex-marriage-by-age-and-state (Nov. 5, 2009, 10:01 PST).
4
I use the term “traditional beliefs” to refer to those whose religion requires the belief that marriage should
only be between a man and a woman.

308

Vol. 5:2]

¶7

¶8

¶9

Marc D. Stern

is really not open to serious question. Just as traditional believers too often slight the
harm done to gays when they are denied access to marriage and its benefits, so too do
advocates of same-sex marriage slight the interference with religious practice that the
recognition of same-sex marriage will inevitably bring about.
Proponents of same-sex marriage deny that recognizing same-sex marriage will
impose any costs on religious liberty because religious leaders and institutions would not
be required to perform or host same-sex marriage ceremonies,5 a proposition echoed by
both the California and Iowa decisions recognizing same-sex marriage. Some even deny
that a conflict exists between religious liberty and recognition of same-sex marriage.
This denial is particularly irritating given the increasing number of cases arising from the
clash between same-sex marriage (or civil unions) and traditional religious practices here
and abroad.6
The issue of whether or not there is a conflict between religion and same-sex
marriages was debated in Maine, where a referendum held last fall invalidated legislation
recognizing same-sex marriage.7 Opponents of same-sex marriage argued, inter alia, that
the legislation should be overturned because of its impact on religious liberty.8 That
argument would have been denied them had the original legislation provided meaningful
religious liberty protection. The issue of religious liberty clashes with same-sex marriage
also helped fuel the passage of Proposition 8 in California.9
In many states where same-sex marriage is on the legislative table, proponents of
same-sex marriage have vigorously opposed any religious exemption beyond the
religious institution ceremony provision.10 In New Hampshire, for example, the governor
5

See, e.g., Dan Gilgoff, Conservative Activists Argue Gay Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 2010,
http://politics.usnews.com/news/religion/articles/2009/05/19/conservative-activists-argue-gay-marriagethreatens-religious-liberty.html; Maine Same Sex Marriage People’s Veto, Question 1 (2009),
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Maine_SameSex_Marriage_People%27s_Veto,_Question_1_%282009%29 (last visited July 1, 2010).
The tenor of the debate can be gathered from Professor Geoffrey Stone’s argument that California’s
Proposition 8 is an establishment of religion because people with traditional religious beliefs were essential
to its passage, and his labeling of the opposition as “self-righteous” and “prejudiced.” Geoffrey R. Stone,
Democracy, Religion & Proposition 8, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2008,
http//:www.huffingtonpost.com/geofrey_r_stone/democracy_religion_and_ pr_b_144103.
6
Various articles compile these cases. See, e.g., Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in
SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, et al., eds.,
2008); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); ANDREW KOPPELMAN & GEORGE W. DENT, JR., MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT
WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? (forthcoming 2010).
7
Maine Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Law, CNN.com, Nov. 4, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/04/maine.same.sex/index.html.
8
Robin F. Wilson, Op-ed, Same Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/125681.html (the “blogged” comments which
follow).
9
Proposition 8 is now codified at CAL. CONST. art I, § 7.5. I am not suggesting that religious liberty was
the primary concern motivating supporters of Proposition 8, just that it was a concern.
10
Greg Kesich, Religious Institutions Don’t Need Protection from Same-Sex Marriage, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, May 27, 2009, at A6; Chistian Ehret, New Hampshire House Rejects Amended Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, JURIST, May 21, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/05/new-hampshire-houserejects-amended.php; Posting of Thomas Berg to Mirror of Justice Blog,
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/10/page/13/ (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:48 EST); Posting of
Emma Ruby-Sachs to 365Gay Agenda Blog, http://www.365gay.com/blog/ruby-sachs-new-hampshiregovernor-worried-about-religious-freedom/ (May 15, 2009, 10:38 EST) (noting that exemption sought by
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had insisted on broad religious liberty protection as a condition for signing same-sex
marriage legislation.11 The legislature originally complied, including protection that
roughly followed what the proposed statute above urges. But, under intense pressure
from proponents of same-sex marriage, the legislature retreated to a far narrower and
mostly meaningless protection for religious institutions.12 The governor did not insist on
the original version, and now the New Hampshire statute legalizes same-sex marriage at
the expense of religious liberty.13
¶10
Given the number of real, litigated conflicts, the claim that there are no such
conflicts is factually untenable. I suspect that the refusal to consider religious liberty
claims is in part fueled by anger at some of the more outrageous statements about gays
made by religious leaders over the years. Or, perhaps, the denial of the existence of a
problem is intended only to shift the focus of the debate to where proponents of same-sex
marriage prefer to have it focused, because their policy arguments are stronger than the
arguments about religious exemptions.
II. LIBERTY V. EQUALITY
A. The Legal Arguments
¶11

As a matter of current First Amendment doctrine, there is much force to the claim
that there is no legally important clash between religious liberty and equal recognition of
same-sex marriage. The controlling case in this area is Employment Division v. Smith,14
in which the Supreme Court held that facially neutral, generally applicable laws
burdening religion need no special legislative justification and, therefore, would not be
subject to compelling (or other heightened) interest analysis.15 Laws that mandate the
acceptance of the validity of same-sex marriage would be neutral laws of general
applicability and, hence, would require no special justification to satisfy the federal
constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion. On the other hand, such indirect
burdens on religious practices might violate state constitutional religious liberty
guarantees in those states departing from the rule introduced in Smith.

the governor would encourage homophobia, and that equality for gays has never interfered with religious
liberty).
11
John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire, Statement on Same-Sex Marriage Bill (May 14, 2009),
available at http://www.nhpr.org/ node/24894.
12
See Wilson, supra note 8.
13
The fight is not confined to the same-sex marriage context. Efforts to protect religious liberty generally
in many legislative forums have been blocked unless they contain an exclusion for gay civil rights claims.
14
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
15
For an example of application of the compelling interest test under state religious freedom acts, modeled
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), see State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d
1004 (Ariz. 2009) (involving religiously mandated use of controlled substances). For a federal case under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see Gonzales v. Centro Espiritu Beneficente Unicio de Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (involving religiously mandated use of controlled substances).
New York applies a modified Smith rule, but one of uncertain scope. See Catholic Charities of
Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006). For cases rejecting Smith’s neutrality rule on
state constitutional grounds, see Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E. 233 (Mass. 1994) (retaining
existing compelling interest standard); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487
N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992) (same).
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Federal statutes, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act16 or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,17 and state equivalents, require accommodation of religious practices in
some contexts regardless of the facial neutrality of a law or policy.18 Other constitutional
provisions—namely the freedom of association as applied in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale,19 and the freedom of speech as in the public school context20—support religious
accommodation as well. These provisions cover some of the same ground that the Free
Exercise Clause used to cover, although freedom of association claims will have little
traction in the business context.
Despite this legal support for the position that there is compulsion to accommodate,
I do not think opponents of a broad protection for religious liberty are at bottom making a
legal claim; rather, they are making a policy argument. They are arguing that the equality
interests behind same-sex marriage trump the liberty interests behind a religious
exemption.
The argument that, as a matter of policy, there are no legitimate religious liberty
claims to be made makes little or no sense if one conceives of the right to same-sex
marriage as rooted in personal liberty. On the other hand, it makes substantial sense if
the argument for same-sex marriage is rooted primarily in a claim about equality.
If the argument for same-sex marriage is rooted in personal liberty (“I can love
whom I want without state interference,” or “so long as no else is hurt, the state should
not regulate my private actions”), one has to confront the fact that liberty to marry whom
one chooses often will conflict with other personal liberties, notably religious freedom (“I
can serve God as I please”), freedom of non-association (“I can serve whom I want”),
and, in some cases, freedom of speech (“I can state my opinions on same-sex marriage
without interference”). One would be hard-pressed to argue that the liberty right to samesex marriage should unfailingly trump those other liberty rights. No principle of liberty
that I can imagine would lead to a rigid preference for one liberty right over all others.
If, however, same-sex marriage rights are rooted not primarily in liberty, as early
challenges to sodomy laws were,21 but in the right to equal treatment, as most
contemporary efforts to legalize same-sex marriage are,22 then the claim that individual

16

42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
Id. § 2000bb.
18
See Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, 313 F.Supp.2d 1069 (D. Colo. 2004). In Buonanno, an employer
required all employees to sign a pledge to respect the sexual choices of their fellow employees. Plaintiff
refused and was fired. He successfully sued under Title VII’s religious accommodation provisions. The
rule requiring the signing of the pledge was neutral and generally applicable, but it failed to meet even the
low standard of justification excusing religious accommodation.
19
530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the right to freedom of association allows Boy Scouts to discharge gay
scoutmaster).
20
Compare Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549
U.S. 1262 (2007) (holding that the school may ban anti-gay speech in interest of protecting gay students
from insult), with Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School Dist., 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the state
has no legitimate interest in protecting people from critical speech).
21
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2006) (invalidating sodomy law on liberty grounds,
though Justice O’Connor, concurring, would have rested on equal protection theories); Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (holding based on the right to privacy); Corn v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992)
(same, but including equal protection); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding
based on the right to privacy).
22
See, e.g., In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009).
17
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liberty claims cannot trump an equality claim makes sense. Equal citizenship claims
stand on a different plane than bare claims of religious liberty.
B. Liberty v. Equality in Practice
¶17

The right to equality has been defined as the most fundamental claim a citizen has
against government: the right to be held in equal regard and to be treated equally by the
government.23 Rights are created by equal citizens, not privileged ones.
¶18
A statute authorizing private departures from the equal treatment mandated by
foundational law could itself be seen as a departure from the guarantee of equal status
before the government. A fortiori, allowing government officials to discriminate against
citizens by refusing to solemnize their weddings would offend the duty of treating
citizens equally and according them equal dignity. Even if equality claims ran only
against the government, the government could be guilty of sanctioning inequality by
virtue of statutes that authorize private discrimination based on religious objections to
same-sex marriage.
¶19
In England, for example, where equality is of cardinal importance in current legal
and political discourse, religious liberty claims to the right not to treat gays equally have
uniformly faired poorly.24 The Charities Commission, a not-for-profit watchdog group,
has cast a highly jaundiced eye on sexual orientation discrimination by charities.25 There
is an effort underway to require parochial schools to teach that same-sex relationships are
normal,26 and a Catholic parochial school was not allowed to fire a headmaster (a
principal for us colonials) who was in a same-sex relationship.27 The Sexual Orientation
Equality Act (passed in 2007) has a most limited exception for religious groups.28 Efforts
to broaden the exemption were successfully challenged, over Prime Minister Blair’s
objections, as an intolerable departure from the principle of equality,29 and even that

23

See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
The cases are collected in Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government
Employee Exemptions, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 319, 324 nn.19–24.
25
See, e.g., In the Matter of Appeal to Charity Tribunal, Catholic Diocese of Leeds v. Charity Commission
[2009] UKFTT 376, available at
http://www.charity.tribunal.gov.uk/documents/decisions/CatholicCareDecision1609v2.pdf; Jessica Geen,
Catholic Adoption Charity to challenge gay ruling in High Court, PINK NEWS, Oct. 14, 2009,
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/10/14/catholic-adoption-charity-to-challenge-gay-ruling-in-the-highcourt/ (reporting on challenge to ruling that Catholic charity could not refuse same-sex adoption
placement).
26
See Tim Ross, Ed Balls to Let Faith Schools Teach Homosexuality is Wrong, LONDON EVENING
STANDARD, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23808956-ed-balls-to-let-faithschools-teach-homosexuality-is-wrong.do. Such schools are now permitted, somewhat vaguely, to address
sexual issues from the point of view of faith.
27
See, e.g., Peter Smith, Nothing We Can Do Says Liverpool Diocese about Openly Gay Headmaster,
LIFESITE NEWS, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2007/aug/07081303.html.
28
Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations, 2007, 2007 No. 1263 (U.K.). The relevant provisions are
§§ 13, 14, and 15.
29
Matthew Tempest, No. 10 Mulls Catholic Opt-Out From Gay Rights Law, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jan/23/immigrationpolicy.religion; Rachel Sylvester, Blair Moves
to Head off Row Over Religion, THE TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2000,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1345007/Blair-moves-to-head-off-row-over-religion.html; Tony
Blair’s Embarrassing Gay Adoptions Climb Down After Cabinet Revolt,
http://direland.typepad.com/direland/2007/01/tony_blairs_emb.html (Jan. 31, 2007).
24
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limited exemption has been criticized by the European Union as too tolerant of
discrimination.30
Of course, modern egalitarians do not limit the demands of equality to equal
treatment by government. Modern civil rights statutes properly reach private
employment,31 housing,32 access for the disabled,33 and the like, typically applying the
same standards to both government and private actors. No more rigorous standard is
applied to Title VII cases brought against government entities than to all but the very
smallest of employers.34 This is a good thing. In a society in which the private sector
controls substantial amounts of access to social goods, it would greatly disadvantage
disfavored groups if, due to private discrimination, they had access only to the resources
controlled by government.
More evidence of the triumph of equality over liberty comes from the public
schools. School officials have allowed students to wear T-shirts expressing support for
gay rights, while suppressing speech by opponents of those rights.35 The justification for
that censorship is rooted in equality: gay students would feel themselves denied an equal
opportunity to take advantage of school when faced with such “attacks” on their
identity.36
It is sometimes said that religious exemptions that burden others are akin to
establishments of religion; that persons adversely affected by the behaviors exempted
from otherwise applicable statutory prohibitions must bear the cost of someone else’s
religious observance. It would follow that any exemption burdening partners to same-sex
marriage would thus be coerced compliance with religious norms. The cryptic opinion in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,37 invalidating an inflexible mandate of religious
accommodation in the employment context, lends some support to this claim. But, given
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,38 upholding a very broad religious
institution exemption from the ban on religious discrimination in employment of Title
VII, the broadest readings of Thornton—denying any religious accommodation—are
implausible. The reality is that there is no clear legal rule distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible accommodation.
Equality does not admit of halfway measures. One is either equal or unequal.
Speaking on gay marriage (as opposed to civil unions), one advocate recently said
30

European Commission, Commission Takes Legal Action Against UK in Gender and Employment
Equality (Nov. 20, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/press_releases/2009/pr09146_en.htm
(exemptions for religious employers to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation are broader than permitted by the Union (directive 2000/78/EC)).
31
E.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2010).
32
E.g., Fair Housing Act, Title VII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2010).
33
E.g., Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2010).
34
Title VII applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees, and New York’s ban on employment
discrimination applies to employers of more than four people. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (2010).
35
Harper v. Poway, 445 F.3d 1166 (2006).
36
See, e.g., Martha M. McCarthy, Student Expression that Collides With The Rights of Others: Should the
Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009); Brian Bilford, Harper’s Bazaar: The
Marketplace of Ideas and Hate Speech, 4 STAN. J.L. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 447, 472 (2008) (“Few
would argue against the Harper court’s lofty goal of protecting students from the pain caused by hate
speech.”).
37
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
38
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (employee fired because no longer in good standing with church operation of
community center).
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“[t]here is no such thing as a fraction of equality. We want equal protection under law.”39
Seen through the prism of individual liberty, it is hard to see why the states should
systematically avoid burdening same-sex couples, no matter how lightly (recall that the
proposed accommodation statute does not apply where gay couples cannot readily find
alternative suppliers), at the expense of other liberties, including the ability of others to
practice their faith. But if the right to same-sex marriage sounds in equality, not liberty,
and the right to equality is given preferential status, then the arguments against an
exemption become plain.
C. The Argument For Liberty
¶24

I believe that if same-sex marriage rights are bottomed in liberty, religious
exemption claims cannot be ignored. One response to this suggestion is to deny that
liberty includes the power to impose costs on others. That is, one’s right to religious
liberty does not include the power to impose personal religious beliefs on same-sex
couples. “Your liberty ends where my nose begins,” as the old adage has it. This,
however, raises the question of where one’s nose begins; that is, whose personal liberties
are the starting points for the analysis? It is one thing to say that a religious Jew,
Catholic, or Mormon has no right to prohibit me from marrying someone of the same sex.
It is quite another to demand that person recognize my union in violation of his beliefs; to
say that I can compel a caterer with traditional religious beliefs to cater my same-sex
wedding ceremony.40 If one starts with the caterer’s rights, it is perfectly cogent to argue
that the liberty interest in same-sex marriage does not extend to the power to compel
others to participate.
¶25
Whose “nose” is impacted when the state, having recognized same-sex marriage,
compels a small family-owned business to subsidize a same-sex spouse’s health
insurance to the same extent as it subsidizes that of a heterosexual spouse, or tells a
wedding photographer that she must accept an assignment at a same-sex wedding
ceremony? What is the “liberty” interest that the gay person has that may compel
someone else to lend support to his or her decision to enter into a same-sex marriage?
These examples demonstrate that, while equality may conclusively exclude claims for
religious exemptions, liberty cannot.
III. RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE
¶26

Some same-sex marriage proponents’ refusal to consider religious liberty claims
stems from a perception that religion has no place in “public” life, that is, outside one’s
own home and place of worship.
¶27
At first glance, this is a claim more acceptable in France, with its policy of lacite,
than the American settlement of official, but benevolent, neutrality towards religion in the
public sphere. And, indeed, in most of Europe, equality claims generally trump religious
39

Apparently, the phrase was first used in a talk by Cleve Jones at the Commonwealth Club. See Nelson
Hernandez & Yamiche Alcindor, Making a Federal Case for Gay Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/11/AR2009101100161.html.
40
It is, of course, impermissible for the state to disfavor certain religious claims specifically because they
are “retrogressive” or because other religious leaders believe them to be a distortion of religious teachings.
Yet people who claim to be advocates of religious liberty sometimes make just these claims.

314

Vol. 5:2]

¶28

¶29

¶30

¶31

Marc D. Stern

liberty ones when the two clash.41 Nevertheless, the claim that religion does not belong
in the public sphere has been heard more frequently and in a variety of contexts in the
United States in recent years,42 so it merits discussion.
For example, in response to religious clashes between physicians and patients over
abortion and end of life decisions, one encounters the argument that we live in a secular
society, so medicine ought to be governed by secular rules only, and that religion has no
place in the “public” practice of medicine. Thus, the argument would follow that,
whatever one’s religious objections to same-sex marriage, in a secular society these
objections have no place in “public,” and they must not be expressed in ways that impact
others.
The popularity of this argument reflects, in part, the decreasing participation in
religion in the country, particularly among the better-educated classes. No doubt, too,
this claim is a backlash against the excesses, real and imagined, of the Bush
Administration and the so-called Religious Right. However one defines the latter, it is
true that some of its spokespersons have invited this backlash by the stridency of their
discourse and political agenda.
In Europe, efforts to forcibly privatize religion have garnered considerable force
and enjoy the general imprimatur of the European Court of Human Rights.43 However,
the put-religion-in-the-closet argument is difficult—no, largely impossible—to reconcile
with the historic American understanding of religious liberty. Unlike the French and
other European settlements, the American settlement does not regard religious challenges
to prevailing social norms as inherently dangerous, to be kept from any public
expression. For example, Muslim head scarves have been banned in France and
Switzerland, yet are commonplace in the United States.
One explanation for this difference may be that we have not known, by and large,
Europe’s religious wars.44 Europe has experienced numerous organized slaughters of
religious dissenters, from the English civil wars and the suppression of the Huguenots, to
the persecution of the Roma, and, of course, the Holocaust. Having witnessed first hand
the devastation religious persecution can reap, Europe may be quick to silence religious
claims of exemption from law and other societal norms. Another explanation is the fact
that European religious practice has been on the decline, even as far back as World War
II.45 What’s politically possible in an increasingly secular Europe is not possible in the
(so far) vastly more religious United States.
41

Various decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have upheld restrictions on Muslim women’s
head coverings on the ground that the restrictions on liberty further the interest in gender equality. See,
e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2005).
42
This claim is quite prominent in Internet discussion-boards, especially with respect to same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Constitutional Democracy or Theocracy?—Same Sex Marriage: Separation of Church and State
(Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/intrv120404.htm; Shannon L.C. Cate, Separation
of Church and State=Same Sex Marriage (Oct. 29, 2008),
http://www.babble.com/CS/blogs/strollerderby/archive/2008/10/29/separation-of-church-and-state-samesex-marriage.aspx.
43
See Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003) (upholding ban on broadcasts of religious
commercials).
44
The Mormon Church might question this assertion, and so might Native Americans.
45
See, albeit with a distinct point of view, Pope Benedict’s reflections on this in JOSEPH RATZINGER (POPE
BENEDICT XVI) & MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS (2005). See generally Loek Halman & Veerle
Draulans, How Secular Is Europe, 57 BRIT. J. SOC. 263 (2006); Liliane Voye, Secularization in a Context of
Advanced Modernity, 60 SOC. RELIGION 275 (1999).
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¶32

If the in-the-closet approach to religion is not formally compatible with American
church-state doctrine, it is also apparently incompatible with American economic
practices. The freedom to practice religious dissent in the United States is in good part a
product of the fact that Americans have not allowed religion to intrude into commerce
and public life, certainly not in modern times.
¶33
We have not known, for example, the Protestant/Catholic troubles of Northern
Ireland, which caused a religious-divide in the housing and employment market.46 Byand-large Americans have not carried doctrinal or theological disputes over to the
marketplace or the workplace. One can say with near certainty that our laws and attitudes
would be different if we had had an experience similar to Northern Ireland. Or maybe
the fact is that the true American religion is the pursuit of profit, in which case few would
choose to take advantage of any religious exemption included in same-sex marriage
legislation if it interfered with the ability to make a profit.
¶34
It may also be that the GLBT community47 and those who practice more liberal
faiths object to protection for traditional religious beliefs in the hope that a same-sex
marriage law would leave such views too expensive to implement. If this is the purpose
of the opposition, legally mandated acceptance of same-sex marriages represents an
unacceptable intrusion of government into an important intra-church dispute. The intrachurch dispute over the acceptance of same-sex marriage is one that, at bottom, plumbs
one’s attitude toward the binding authority of religious texts, their interpretation,
religious traditions, and the question of whether God imposes norms that impose heavy
burdens on people. The government has no place deliberately intruding into this dispute
beyond offering legal protection for the liberal view in its own spheres.
IV. RESPECT FOR MORAL CHOICES
¶35

There is one final argument sometimes heard regarding same-sex marriage. It is
the argument that respect for other people’s moral choices prohibits tolerance of the
refusal to facilitate those choices. The argument has two parts: one supporting moral
autonomy and the other making religious claims.
¶36
The moral autonomy claim is the belief that the moral choices of citizens may not
be questioned by other citizens, at least not in ways that move beyond the theoretical.
One may not confront an individual’s moral choice directly, or impede him or her in
acting on that moral choice. This, however, is to confuse immunity from legal
impediments to carrying out one’s moral choices, on the one hand, with a ban on
criticism and the refusal to assist in the carrying out of other’s moral choice on the other
hand. The two are not the same. The former is often permissible in a liberal democracy;
the latter is at odds with it. Yet contemporary political discourse often confuses the two.
Respect for the moral autonomy of an individual demands that one not be forced to act in
a way that goes against moral choices, such as the choice not to accept same-sex
marriage.
46

That, at least, is the standard story. For partially dissenting views, see Vani K. Borooah, et al., Catholic
Protestant Income Differences, 41 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 41 (1995); Christopher Hewitt, Catholic
Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: a
Reconsideration, 32 BRIT. J. SOC. 362 (1981).
47
The “GLBT community” refers to Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender persons and those who
support them.
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The second part of the argument, the claim about religion, attempts to expound on
the meaning of religion and the definition of sin. This argument states that it is no sin to
help someone else carryout, under coercion of law, a legal and (arguably) moral act that
one believes to be a sin. The basis of this argument, which can be traced back to John
Locke’s Letter on Toleration, is either that officially coerced activity is no more sinful
than any coerced act which would not be a sin, or that moral responsibility lies solely
with the person committing the primary evil. Therefore, the argument goes, the
recognition of a same-sex marriage, which one finds sinful, would not itself be a sin.
Many religions teach otherwise, so to assert this is to stand in the place of religious
leaders and assert a religious proposition. Such blatant interference with religion should
not be tolerated.
V. CONCLUSION

¶38

As demonstrated above, there is no legal justification for a religious exemption if
the right to same-sex marriage is based in equality. At the same time, there are various
and compelling non-legal arguments for the appreciation of religious liberty. In the end,
we must decide whether equality must make room for liberty (and liberty for equality).
The take-no-prisoners approach to politics that categorizes so much of the contemporary
debate makes it unlikely that any middle ground will emerge—and, in fact, this is how
the debate is proceeding. This is unfortunate, as I have demonstrated that a qualified
religious exemption may preserve religious liberty without placing too large a burden on
the equality of same-sex couples.
¶39
Beyond the same-sex marriage debate, some of the most common and divisive
issues on the legislative agenda implicate the clash between equality (e.g., universal
medical care, campaign finance limitations, etc.) and liberty (e.g., conscience clauses,
objections to compulsory purchases of insurance, etc.). Neither proponents of equality
nor of liberty seem prepared to acknowledge that, while these two values are sometimes
in conflict, both are valuable and should be protected. Sometimes one or the other will
need to yield, but often there is some way to maximize both. Too many people prefer the
simplicity of a mono-polar tradition to a complex one. That is too bad.
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